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)ROORZLQJ +LWOHU¶V FRPLQJ WR SRZHU WKH 9HUVDLOOHV SHDFH UHJLPH ZDV
JLYHQDIDWDOEORZ7RFRXQWHU*HUPDQ\¶VJURZLQJLQIOXHQFHLQWKH'DQXEH
valley France was following a rather zigzagging way. Sometimes it echoed 
views according to which the Trianon treaties had to be revised thus Paris 
GLGQ¶W UHIXVH+XQJDU\¶V FODLPV IRU UHYLVLRQ VRPHWLPHV LW UHSUHVHQWHG WKH
most aggressive streams of the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ concerning Hungary. The 
French-Hungarian relations perfectly mirrored the consequence of the 
swiftly changing attitude of Paris. A dramatic change occurred when France 
was crushed by Germany and Vichy became the governing force of the 
country ± as the war neared its end Vichy France became more and more 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWRZDUG+XQJDU\¶V WHUULWRULDOFODLPV$WUDJLFFKDSWHURI WKH
*HUPDQRFFXSDWLRQDQG9LFK\¶VDQWL-Semite politics was the handling of the 
situation of Hungarian Jews trapped in France.  
This paper traces the diplomatic history of the years 1933-1944 on the 
basis of reports of the Hungarian envoys to Paris and to Vichy. 
Keywords: Trianon treaty; Little Entente; Barthou and Hungary; 
.iOPiQ .iQ\D¶V YLVLW WR 3DULV; Hungarian envoys to Paris; Khuen-
+pGHUYiU\; the fate of Hungarian Jews in occupied France; )UDQFH¶V DQG
+XQJDU\¶VFRPPRQILJKWDJDLQVWEROVKHYLVP;  
 
The Hungarian-French relations have never been in the mainstream 
RIWKHWZRFRXQWULHV¶GLSORPDF\- excepted for some very rare historical 
moments. The First World War and the following peace regime heavily 
hit the lukewarm mutual interests. Some of the most rational politicians 
of the victorious side knew well from the very first moments that the 
Versailles peace was erroneous and the treaties forced on the vanquished 
side would inevitably drive to heavy conflicts ± to war. The thought of 
redrawing the new European borders was present almost everywhere 
and Hungary was not alone with that urge.  . 
At the beginning of the Thirties it became more or less clear that 
French dreams tied to the creation of the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ had not 
became true and the Third Republic itself was forced to face more and 
more serious problems. In the new situation of international politics the 
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Hungarian diplomacy became aware of a window of opportunity and 
VWDUWHGWRDFWIHYHULVKO\WRREWDLQLWVUHYLVLRQLVWJRDOV« At Christmas of 
1932, a number of French journalists visited Budapest upon the 
invitation of the Lord Mayor DQGWKHQHZVSDSHU3HVWL+tUODS7KHy paid 
a visit to Prime Minister *|PE|V*|PE|V WROG WKHP WKDWKH VWURYH WR
develop the economic cooperation with the neighboring countries, but 
ÄWKH SUHFRQGLWLRQ WR WKDW ZDV WKH HDVLQJ RI WKH FRQVWUDLQW SXW RQ
+XQJDU\¶V HFRQRPLF OLIH i.e. the removal of protectionist tarifIV¶
V\VWHPVDQGWKHDEROLWLRQRI UHVWULFWLRQV´. He thought that these goals 
required common work between the Central-and Eastern European 
FRXQWULHV&RQFHUQLQJWKLVLGHD*|PE|VVHQWEDFNDVLJQDOWRWKH)UHQFK
that he did not refuse the realizations of the Tardieu-plan aiming at the 
economic cooperation in the Danube valley, a plan which was so 
important to the French diplomacy that it served for years as a backbone 
IRU)UDQFH¶VGLSORPDF\¶Vstrategy elaborated for the region.2  
*|PE|VZHQWIXUWKHUZKHQKHVtated ÄZLWKSOHDVXUH´ that the last period 
+XQJDU\ KDG EHHQPHHWLQJ ORWV RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RQ )UDQFH¶V EHKDOI DQG
expressed his gratitude to Paris for its assistance to overcome the economic 
crisis in Hungary. Then the Hungarian Premier stated that his aim was ÄWKH
further development of political and economic ties between the two 
countries and he was convinced that every possibilities existed to achieve 
WKLVJRDO´3 *|PE|V¶RSWLPLVPZDVSRVVLEO\PRWLYDWHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWLQ
DFFRUGLQJWRWKH/LOODIUHG Treaty Paris gave a significantly preferential tariff 
on the export of 900 thousand tons of Hungarian wheat to France. Since the 
IROORZLQJ \HDU¶V )UHQFK UHFRUG ZKHDW SURGXFWLRQ PDGH WKH ZKHDW LPSRUW
unnecessary, on the demand of the Hungarian party France transferred the 
preferential tariff from wheat to corn. This gesture of Paris undoubtedly 
indicated a certain interest of the French government toward Hungary. And 
the Hungarian expectations were very well illustrated by the Paris 
FRUUHVSRQGHQW¶V FRPPHQWof the Pesti Hirlap on the results of the French 
parliamentary elections in 1932: the presence of the leftist bourgeois parties 
in the new government assured a better prospects ÄIRURXUUHYLVLRQLVWJRDOV´4 
Also, the reports of the Hungarian envoys to Rome and Paris pointed 
to the same direction. This latter send up a lengthy report about a warm 
letter addressed to him by Pierre Cot (former Foreign Secretary of state, 
at that time Air Minister) ± who was highly appreciated by the 
Hungarian government due to the fact that as French delegate to the 
League of Nations gave voice to his conviction that Ä,W PXVW EH D
                                                             
2 In this regard some public opinion forming views converged. It appeared to the 
Hungarian Revisionist Ligue that Ä)UDQFH GRHV QRW FRQVLGHU DQ\PRUH WKH SXUHO\
military point of views but it participates in the reconstruction of economies 
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possibility within the framework of the League of Nations to correct the 
SHDFH WUHDWLHV DQG , EHOLHYH WKLV SRVVLELOLW\ H[LVWV´ But he also 
remarked, that international law and order rested on the respect of 
treaties till they were valid, and other treaties could be changed but by 
other treaties.5 
&RW¶VVWDQGSRLQWZDVLGHQWLFZLWKWKDWRIKLV3DUW\WKH5DGLFDO3DUW\
and Cot gave a more detailed analysis on his opinion at a rally in Paris: 
ÄWKH SHDFH WUHDWLHV RI -1920 are defectives, sincerely they are not 
SHDFH WUHDWLHV « WKH\ DUH WUHDWLHV GLFWDWHG E\ WKH YLFWRU WR WKH
vanquished and lots of their dispositions cannot be supported without 
dangers. For the sake of peace we should find a way to modify them by 
peaceful means. The 19th paragraph of the League of Nations gives a 
ground in principle WR PRGLILFDWLRQV´ 3LHUUH &RW developed identical 
thoughts at a Budapest conference organized by the Hungarian Foreign 
Affairs Society.6  
When returning from Budapest Pierre Cot paid a call on the 
Hungarian envoy to Paris. He informed Villani that he met Governor 
+RUWK\ DQG 3ULPH PLQLVWHU *|PE|V WRR DOEHLW ERWK PHHWLQJV ZHUH
confidential, not communicated WRWKHSUHVVSUHVXPDEO\RQ3LHUUH&RW¶V
wish).   The envoy added his own opinion: Ä:HFDQUHDOO\FRXQWRQ&RW´ 
but anything, which can compromise Cot, should be avoided, and it 
would be counterproductive to draw public attention to his friendly 
feelings toward Hungary and to his views about the idea of revision.7  
%XW3LHUUH&RW¶VRSLQLRQRQWKH9HUVDLOOHVWUHDWLHVZDVZLGHO\NQRZQ
As he reiterated in an interview to the Petit Journal ± he was of the 
opinion that the provisions of the peace treaties were disposing of the 
revision of the Versailles treaties themselves and what is more France 
started the process of revision by initiating the modification of war 
reparations and by its military proposals to Germany. Treaties do not 
live forever ± he went on ± they must be amended following the rhythm 
RI FKDQJHV LQ WKH QDWLRQV¶ H[LVWHQFH %XW XQLODWHUDO FDQFHOODWLRQ RI
treaties is inadmissible.8 7KDW LV WR VD\ WKDW HYHQ DFFRUGLQJ WR &RW¶V
conception border-revisions - wished by Hungary - would not be 
possible without the agreement of Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ countries. And this 
had no reality sic rebus stantibus.  
At the same time Cot expected a solution from the Ä)RXU 3RZHUV
3DFW´ considering that the Äthought RIUHYLVLRQH[SDQGV´ and sooner or 
later the four Grand Powers must deal with this question. Meanwhile the 
YDJXHQHVV RI )UDQFH¶V SRVLWLRQZDVZHOO LOOXVWUDWHG E\&RW¶V RWKHU YLHZ
according to which the Tardieu-plan or something similar could offer a 
                                                             
5 ibid 30 May 1931. 
6 ibid 
7 HNA, K63, 1933-1/7. (23 Jan.1933.) 
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solution for Central-Europe ± but he saw quite clearly that this cRXOGQ¶W
give a full economic solution, and from a political point of view it was a 
heavy obstacle. He considered an economic cooperation with the Ä/LWWOH
(QWHQWH´ very complicated for Hungary ÄWLOOVRPHERUGHUPRGLILFDWLRQWR
our advantage does not bring sRPHVSLULWXDOUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ´. There was 
no other alternative because the neighboring countries would protest 
most vigorously against an Austro-Hungarian Union in whatever form it 
FRXOG EH DQG WKH $QVFKOXVV ZRQ¶W EH SHUPLWWHG E\ ,WDO\ RU )UDQFH9 - 
reported Villani the Hungarian envoy to Paris. 
The Hungarian envoy to Rome was in very good term with Henry de 
Jouvenel, a French senator with a very respectful government carrier 
who worked a short period in Rome as French ambassador to improve 
the French-Italian relations. The Hungarian envoy to Rome reported 
one of his conversations with de Jouvenel.10 To begin de Jouvenel told 
him that he was not anymore envoy to Rome, as his assignment touched 
its end and so what he was going to say was unofficial. He underlined 
that to obtain an agreement with its neighbors would be much easier if 
+XQJDU\ZHUHQ¶WSDUWRIDEORF7KLVZDVREYLRXVO\DPHVVDJHIURPWKH
4XDL G¶2UVD\ JLYHQ WKH IDFW WKDW WKH ,WDOR-Hungarian rapprochement 
disturbed French interests.) He was curious about relations between 
Austria and Hungary. He was convinced that a good atmosphere 
required for a revision could be obtained by economic and trade treaties 
with the concerned countries ± (according to the Tardieu-plan.) 
According to the Hungarian envoy, the root of this atmosphere was 
the very first moment when the Hungarian interest manifested ice-cold 
refusal and brutal threats. He added, Ä+XQJDU\GRHVQ¶WGLVSRVHRIUHDO
force that could have a power of deterrence and lead to a better 
understanding by thHQHLJKERULQJVWDWHV´. Hungary must be also equal 
from a military aspect, to level with its neighbors under the same 
FRQGLWLRQV ,WGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDW WKH+XQJDULDQJRYHUQPHQWZRXOG OLNH
to enforce Hungarian interests by violence.   
De Jouvenel partly agreed with the Hungarian envoy but Hungary 
had a faulty conception in wishing to rearm when the question of 
disarmament came into prominence in Europe ± he said. In his view a 
special security settling could be found for Hungary. He added he was 
not at all ravished by the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ and Hungary could be a 
trustier barrier to counter ÄFHUWDLQ WUHQGV´ WKDQ WKH Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ ± 
created like every alliance against the common outer threat, against the 
common danger and when these latters disappeared so did the need for 
the alliance. As for the territorial revision he thought that it had some 
hope in respect of Czechoslovakia, concerning Yugoslavia the question 
                                                             
9 HNA, K63, 1933-1/7. (8 Jul. 1933.) 
10 7KHUHSRUWZDVSHUKDSVZULWWHQLQ$XJXVWEHFDXVHGH-RXYHO¶VDVVLJQPHQWZDV
for six months and their first meeting took place in January. 
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was irrelevant EHFDXVH RI WKH IDFW WKDW WKH GHWDFKHG WHUULWRULHV¶
population was Croatian. Romania was the most problematic country 
but as far as he knew the Romanian had some plan concerning 
Transylvanian autonomy. The Hungarian envoy drew the conclusion 
that his partner practically considered revision feasible but calm 
atmosphere would be needed and the road to revision was to build 
Hungarian-Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ economic ties. But the solution would be put 
in danger if Hungary joined some bloc with economic or political 
significance.11 Another information of the Hungarian envoy to Rome 
corroborated this thought ± the French envoy to Rome advised his 
Austrian colleague ÄQRWWRELQGWKHPWR+XQJDU\´12 
But the fact that some actors of French politics were ready to 
recognize legitimate parts of the Hungarian demands for the revision of 
Trianon did not mean that the French political elite¶s way of thinking 
changed as well. According to reports and analysis of the pre-war 
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, French messages sent to the Hungarian 
government were ÄXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´ and ÄUHMHFWLQJ´ at the same time. The 
Hungarian envoy to Paris called on former Prime Minister Herriot who 
told him that in the framework of a longer Central-European round trip 
he would also visit Hungary. He added that the peace treaties closing the 
World War were unsuccessful and he would willingly back Hungarian 
aspirations among to correct them. But   to change them was not 
possible in the given situation since ÄWKHZKROH(XURSHZDVVLFNDQGWKH
PRVW LPSRUWDQW WDVN QRZ ZDV WR LQVXUH SHDFH DQG FDOP´13 The 
Hungarian General Consul to Bratislava reported that ± in contradiction 
WR+HUULRW¶V VWDWHPHQW ± the French ambassador to Prague repeatedly 
told his audience at a rally that France never would give her accord to 
the re-annexation of (Hungarian) territories.14 
A Ä7RS 6HFUHW´ report about a session of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the French Parliament had been sent to Budapest by the 
Hungarian envoy to Paris. The turbulent event had a warlike 
atmosphere, some M.P. considered forming Italian- German-Hungarian 
cooperation (an ÄDOOLDQFHRIdefiance and mutual defense´) so dangerous 
that they suggested to launch a pre-emptive war, stating that the Italians 
and Germans were not militarily strong yet and ÄPXVWEHEURNHQQRZ´.15 
Envoy Villani drew the conclusion from all which was said at the session 
of the French parliament Foreign Affairs committee that the French-
Hungarian relation ÄJUDGXDOO\GHWHULRUDWHGGXULQJ WKH ODVWZHHNV´. As it 
usually happened ± he wrote ± voices sympathizing with Hungary stopped 
                                                             
11 HNA, k63, 1933 ± 1/7 
12 ibid 21 Jun 1933. 
13 ibid 16 Jun.1933. 
14 ibid 8 Jun. 1933. 
15 HNA, K63, 1933-1/7. 18 March 1933. 
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short as soon as the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ started its ofIHQVLYHLQWKH4XDLG¶2UVD\
Moreover the fact that the new Hungarian Foreign Minister arrived from 
Berlin to the ministerial position formed the opinion within some French 
circles that Hungarian politics were put under German influence and the 
new Hungarian Premier sympathized ZLWK WKH QHZ *HUPDQ FKDQFHOORU¶V
endeavors. Other components in France were at the opinion that Italian 
influence prevailed in Hungary so this latter was lost for France 
consequently Budapest could no longer count on her goodwill. The envoy 
added that the French counter-intelligence investigated the Hungarian 
legation presuming that this latter had been financing newspapers 
publishing favorable articles on Hungary.16   
7KH +XQJDULDQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\¶V SODQQLQJ WRZDUGV )UDQFH ZDV PDGH
very complicated, indeed by the fact that the successive governments in 
Paris had been unable to formulate a coherent standpoint toward the 
Eastern-European region and the Hungarian endeavors. The Hungarian 
government decided not ÄWR ZULJKW GRZQ´ the French relation yet, 
following the declaration of French Foreign Minister Paul-Boncourt who 
FOHDUO\VDZWKDW+XQJDU\FRXOGQ¶WOLYHLQWKHJLYHQFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGZDV
convinced Hungary had to hammer out an agreement with its neighbors. 
Hungarian revision was necessary and economic agreements were needed 
± he said.17 &RQVHTXHQWO\)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU.iQ\DJDYHWKHÄ<HVPD\EH´ 
DQVZHU WR)UHQFKHQYR\GH9LHQQHZKHQKHDVNHG.iQ\DZRXOGKHYLVLW
Paris.18 $ZHHN ODWHU.iQ\D received de Vienne again. He ± de Vienne - 
reported that Paul-Boncourt would welcome the Hungarian Foreign 
Minister to Paris ± but he could not forward an official letter of invitation 
considering the sensibility of Italy19 and that of the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´.   
'XULQJWKHSUHSDUDWLRQRI.iQ\D¶VWULSWKH4XDLG¶2UVD\GLGQRWIDLOWR
criticize the Hungarian Premier for during his visit to Rome he 
paramounted questions related to border revisions, which the French 
Foreign ministry testified against.20 The French envoy to Budapest told 
Khuen-+pGHUYDU\ WKDW ÄQDWXUDOO\´ during the ministerial meeting the 
                                                             
16 ibid 17 Febr. 1933. 
17 ibid 5 Jul. 1933. 
18 ibid 13 Jul. 1933. 
19 The remark concerning Italy is misunderstandable. The Political Department 
VHQW WKHQRWHDERXW WKH.iQ\D-de Vienne meeting to the Hungarian envoy to Paris 
wiWK WKH FRPPHQW WKDW GXULQJ KLV YLVLW WR 5RPH .iQ\D ZDQWHG WR PHQWLRQ WR
Mussolini his plan to go to Paris but Mussolini raised the question first and told 
.iQ\D WR SD\ D FDOO RQ KLV )UHQFK FRXQWHUSDUW Ä,W LV WUXH WKDW \RX ZRQ¶W REWDLQ
anything but the merHIDFWRIWKHYLVLWFRXOGHDVHWKHVLWXDWLRQ´. ibid 2.Aug. 1933. It 
LVTXLWHLQWHUHVWLQJWKDW*|PE|V¶VYLVLWWR5RPHZDVTXDOLILHGE\WKH)UHQFK)RUHLJQ
Minister a Ä&DQRVVDSHOJULPDJH´ because ±as he saw it ± Mussolini was angry about 
*|PE|V¶VYLVLWWR%HUOLQDQGWKH'XFHWKRXJKWWKDWDQHYDQWXDOYLVLWRI*|PE|VWR
Paris would be absolutely ÄQRQVHQV´ Report of the Hungarian envoy to Paris. ibid. 
20 ibid 2 Aug. 1933. 
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UHYLVLRQRIERUGHUUHVROXWLRQVRIWKHSHDFHWUHDWLHVFRXOGQ¶WEHGLVFXVVHG
Paris wished that the object of incoming talks be ± prior to everything ± 
ÄXQH[DPHQPpWKRGLTXH´ of the most important and urgent questions.21   
2QH RI WKH ILOHV EHDUV VRPH OLQHVZULWWHQZLWK.iQ\D¶V RZQKDQG ± 
instructions to the Hungarian envoys to Rome and Ankara. The envoy to 
Rome should communicate to ÄFRPSHWHQW OHYHOV´ WKDW .iQ\D JRHV WR
Paris as he notified in advance Mussolini what Mussolini ÄDSSURYHG´ 
Ä7KHYLVLWGRHVQRWKDYHDQ\VSHFLDOSXUSRVHVLWLVDFRXUWHV\FDOOWRSXW
WKH)UHQFKLQDEHWWHUPRRGWRZDUGXV´ These handwritten lines prove 
that the Hungarian diplomacy did not nourish excessive illusion for a 
positive change of France toward Budapest. 
0RUHRYHU SULRU WR WKLV WULS 3ULPH PLQLVWHU *|PE|V SXW RQ WKH
record22 that the Ä'XQDFRQIHGHUDWLRQ´ plan which was so important for 
France ± and in the case of its realization would ÄVSLULWXDOL]H´ or would 
render Ätheoretical´ the Trianon borders ± was inacceptable for Hungary 
because this plan would perpetuate ÄWKHHVWDEOLVKHGRUGHURIWRGD\´. In 
this judgment *|PE|VZDVULJKWRIFRXUVH23 2QWKHILUVWGD\RI.iQ\D¶V
ÄFRXUWHV\ FDOO´24 just to avoid possible misunderstandings the ÄVHPL-
offLFLDO´ QHZVSDSHURI WKH4XDLG¶2UVD\/H7HPSVQDLOHGGRZQWKDW ÄLQ
(XURSH¶VSUHVHQWVLWXDWLRQWKHUHYLVLRQRIWKH9HUVDLOOHVWUHDWLHVZRXOG
undoubtedly involve the gravest consequences and would inevitably 
WULJJHUZDU´ The journal did not forget to add that Paris insisted on its 
standpoint, namely that the Danube states must eliminate all political 
considerations when organizing their economic ties. The condition of 
peace in Central-Europe was ÄWR VSDUH WKH LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG
sovereignty of all Danube statHV´ Problems in Central-Europe could not 
be solved but within the framework of cooperation with the Ä/LWWOH
(QWHQWH´. Budapest should understand that the key of booming its 
economy could only be found in a sincere cooperation with the 
neighboring countries.25 
The Hungarian foreign minister met the French Premier, the foreign 
minister and the President, too and he did not touch political (i.e. 
revision dissecting) affairs, indeed. He ascertained the positive trend in 
French-Hungarian trade and he thanked the French financial and 
economic support. He gave utterance to his satisfaction over the French 
comprehension for the Hungarian economic endeavor and its wishes to 
                                                             
21 ibid. 11 Sept. 1933. 
22 3HVWL+tUODSVHSW 
23 As Bethlen refused this French idea during his talks with Mussolini in Rome 
the 4th April 1927. 
24 Only one of his collaborators accompanied him ± to show the non-official 
character of his visit (prior to him the Hungarian Prime minister was in the French 
capital in February 1930.) 
25 BudapestL+tUODS6HSW 
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LQVXUHJRRGPDUNHWVIRU+XQJDU\¶VSURGXFWVE\DSSURSULDWHWUHDWLHV%XW
the Parisian press hurried to add that the condition of the French 
goodwill was that Hungary does omit the revision. During his talks 
.iQ\D PDGH FOHDU WR KLV FRXQWHUSDUWV WKH +XQJDULDQ JRYHUQPHQW¶s 
conditions as for the cooperation with Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ states ± i.e. 
Hungary gives its accord to the French initiatives urging a Danubian 
confederation (toward the first step would be bilateral treaties) if the 
Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ shows goodwill and understanding.26 (But those two 
conditions would have meant de facto cancellation of the Trianon 
treaties guarantying the existence of the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ countries.) As 
final act of the talks the French foreign minister offered a lunch in honor 
WR.iQ\DDQGWR%ULWLVKIRUHLJQPLQLVWHU(GHQZKRZDVLQ3DULVWRR 
According to the expectations .iQ\D¶V YLVLW GLGQ¶W EULQJ DQ\ UHVXOW
except the usual ÄIORZHU WKURZLQJ´. Following the French-Hungarian 
foreign ministerial meeting the Hungarian envoy to Paris paid a call on 
WKHJHQHUDOVHFUHWDU\RIWKH4XDLG¶2UVD\ZKRDSSUHFLDWHG.iQ\D¶VYLVLW
with empty polite phrases. After that, the chief press officer of the Quai 
G¶2UVD\WROGKLP.iQ\DZDVYHU\ZLVHQRWWRUDLVH LVVXHVHPEDUUDVVLQJ
the French side. He added the French public opinion was not so deeply 
averse to the thought of revision as it was some years ago. Ä,QIDFWSULRU
WR+LWOHU¶VFRPLQJWRSRZHUZHZHUHQHDUHU WRVSHDNRSHQO\DERXW LW
But today we face another situation we should wait patiently´27- the 
French diplomat concluded. 
The open indifference was motivated not only by the lack of mutual 
interests but also by another confidential, immature± then dropped ± 
conception concerning Hungary's handling. According to a note sent by 
WKH+XQJDULDQ3ULPHPLQLVWHU¶VRIILFHWRWKHIRUHLJQPLQLVWHUWKH)UHQFK
legation to Budapest had been instructed to inquire about the Hungarian 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V SROLWLFV WRZDUG WKH GLSORPDWLF DFWLYLW\ RI WKH Äswastika 
EHDULQJ´ German government. Coming from a confidential source 
within the French foreign ministry an information stated that the Quai 
G¶2UVD\DQGRWKHUSRlitical circles were of the opinion that the best way 
for the revisionist policy of the Hungarian government would be the 
signing of neutrality treaties ± like Switzerland. The bearers of this 
conception thought that the question of the Hungarian revision would be 
solved by other European events and when they would arrive the 
Hungarian neutrality would be the stimulus for the detached regions to 
go back to Hungary. The French idea also underlined the possibility, that 
the Western powers would need a neutral territory - like Switzerland ± 
very soon in the East. In view of these circumstances ± the confidential 
source said ± the competent French authorities would be pleased if the 
idea of ÄQHXWUDO +XQJDU\´ had not been presented as a French one, 
                                                             
26 3HVWL+tUODS6HSW 
27 HNA K63, 1933 -1/. 1 Oct. 1933. 
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instead the HuQJDULDQ JRYHUQPHQW LH *|PE|V VKRXOG FRPH WR 3DULV
ZLWK VXFK D SODQ EHDULQJ0XVVROLQL¶V DFFRUG 7KH )UHQFK VLGH GLG QRW
preclude the possibility that such a Hungarian proposal about neutrality 
could be the starting point of an imminent partial revision which later 
could be concluded to a full revision. The Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ VWDWHVFRXOGQ¶W
DUJXH DJDLQVW D SURSRVDO RQ +XQJDU\¶V QHXWUDOLW\ VWDWLQJ WKDW WKH\
needed the detached territories to counter a Hungarian aggression 
against them. This way Paris could handle more easily the Ä/LWWOH
(QWHQWH´ states and so the Trianon ice barrier could be broken.28 
This idea lacked any realistic support. Not only did the Hungarian 
government consider the neutral status absolutely inconceivable but (as 
Villani the Hungarian eQYR\ WR 3DULV FOHDUO\ SRLQWHG RXW +LWOHU¶V
withdrawal from the League of Nations isolated Germany, strengthened 
the unified front of the Great Powers, and what directly concerned 
+XQJDU\ +LWOHU¶V PRYH UHQGHUHG PRUH LQWHQVLYH UHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ
France and her allies in the East. The distrust against Hungary increased 
again in Paris (as it was at the coming to power of Hitler) because France 
considered Hungary ÄDV WKH QDWXUDO DOO\ RI WKH 5HLFK´ ± reported 
Villani.29 
In his political report on the year of 1933 Villani underlined that the 
GLVWUXVWZDVIHGE\WKHSXEOLFRSLQLRQ¶VJHQHUDOFRQYLFWLRQWKDW+XQJDU\
ZRXOGIROORZ*HUPDQ\WKURXJKILUHDQGZDWHU7KH+XQJDULDQ3UHPLHU¶V
visit to Berlin, the nomination of the former Hungarian envoy to Berlin 
to foreign minister reputed germanofil and the fact that at the 
disarmament conference the Hungarian delegates voted always together 
with the German only nourished that conviction. French circles 
sympathizing with the idea of revision were convinced that in the chaotic 
(XURSHDQVLWXDWLRQLWZRXOGQ¶WEHRSSRUWXQHWR LQFUHDVHWKHQXPEHURI
problems by raising the question of revision.30 And this sympathy had 
slowly been drifting away from the main stream of French foreign policy 
and its last representatives tried to convince the Hungarian government 
to take back from the intensity of its revisionist propaganda.31 The 
reason of this change was ± as the new Hungarian envoy to Paris Khuen-
+pGHUYiU\UHSRUWHGEDFNKRPHRQ WKHEDVLVRIKLV IUHVK LPSUHVVLRQV± 
the fact that French official circles and parts of the political public 
opinion concluded with resignation that France had no more means to 
stop the German rearmament. In such circumstances it was quite 
understandable ± wrote the new Hungarian envoy to Paris ± that Paris 
wanted to have more intimate relations with the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ which 
                                                             
28 LGHPZLWKRXWH[DFWGDWH2QWKHGDPDJHGGRFXPHQWRQHFDQUHDG«EHU 
29 idem 21 Oct. 1933. 
30 HNA K63 1934-11/1, 16 Jan. 1934.  
31 idem 17 Jan. and 6 March ± ViOODQL¶VIDUHZHOOYLVLWDQGWKHFXUWHV\FDOORIWKH
new Hungarian envoy to Paris Khuen-+pGHUYiU\RQWKH)UHQFK3ULPHPLQLVWHU 
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was the most important pillar of the French foreign policy.32 
And the tightening of those links happened after all. The government 
of the ÄOHIWLVWFDUWHO´ fell following the events of February 1934 and was 
succeeded by the government of ÄQDWLRQDO XQLW\´ of Doumergue from 
the Radical Party. The portfolio of foreign affaires was given to Henry 
Barthou (who later lost his life in the Marseilles terrorist attack) ± and 
that brought a total change in the French judgment of the Hungarian 
revisionist endeavor. The former ÄXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´ was changed into an 
intransigent, one-sided approach - which could not but strengthen the 
Italian and German orientation of the Hungarian government. The 
French government while struggling with heavy political trouble ± 
totally misunderstanding what happened in Europe and miscalculating 
his role within this new situation ± resorted to its old Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ 
politics which reflected his old Great Power status.  
Moreover France made efforts to make clear this ÄROG-QHZ´ policy by 
spectacular consultations and statements. Khuen-+pGHUYiU\UHSRUWHGRQ
WKH -XJRVODY IRUHLJQ PLQLVWHU¶V YLVLW WR 3DULV WKDW WKH )UHQFK DQG
Jugoslav foreign ministers¶ VWDQGSRLQW RQ WKH UHYLVLRQ ZDV absolutely 
identic ± they were firmly against.33 Barthou confirmed this standpoint a 
few days later in Belgrade where he went from the Bucharest meeting of 
the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ standing committee to. He stated that France 
ZRXOGQ¶WSHUPLWWKHFKDQJHRIERUGers and when a journalist asked him 
what would be the reaction of Hungary to his statement Barthou 
answered: Ä)RU%XGDSHVW,DPDGHDGPDQWKH\KDYHSXWPHDILUHDW
WKLVYHU\PRPHQW´34 Later events proved that Barthou delivered a fatal 
blow to the possibilities given by at least partial understanding of 
+XQJDU\¶VSRVLWLRQV 
In June 1934 the French foreign minister went to Bucharest to attend 
the meeting of the Permanent Committee of the ÄLittle (QWHQWH´. His 
performance in Bucharest plainly convinced the Hungarian leadership 
that as for its revisionist goals Paris became again one of its most 
consistent adversaries. Barthou stated that France and Romania shared 
common values and the same ideals. Both of them had retaken 
territories belonged to them (i.e. Transylvania and Alsace-Lorraine). 
This thesis was the base of treaties signed in Versailles. Justice had 
triumphed. The revision of peace treaties would have been the 
renouncement of rights. The observation of the peace treaties was the 
law for France and Romania!  
Then during his speech in front of the Romanian parliament he 
                                                             
32 idem 17 May 1934. 
33 HNA K63 1934-11/1, 18 Jun. 1934. 
34 3HVWL +tUODS  -XQ  %DUWKRX KLQWHG DW WKH IDFW WKDW GXULQJ D QRQ-
authorized (and crushed by the police) rally the crowd set afire a strowman 
representing Barthou.  
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added (expressing his gratitude for his freshly granted Romanian 
citizenship!) ÄWKHSHDFHKDVJDYHEDFNWR\RX\RXUERUGHUVZKLFKKDYH
DOZD\V EHHQ \RXUV DQGZLOO UHPDLQ \RXUV´. Ä$OO RI those who wants 
back one of square centimeter (of your territories) will not only face 
your resistance but that of France, too because you will have the 
support of France. We want the peace which conserves and secures the 
ODZIXOO\DFTXLUHGULJKWV´35  
Perhaps WKH4XDLG¶2UVD\ IHOW WKDW WKH IRUHLJQPLQLVWHURYHUVKRW WKH
mark because the French envoy to Budapest paid a quick call on Hory 
the chief of the Political department of the Hungarian foreign ministry. 
The goal of his visit was to enlighten %DUWKRX¶VVWatements in his visit to 
5RPDQLD +RU\ WROG WKH )UHQFK HQYR\ WKDW %DUWKRX¶V SKUDVHV LQ
Bucharest were anti-Hungarian and legitimated atrocities committed 
DJDLQVW+XQJDULDQLQ7UDQV\OYDQLD'H9LHQQHDQVZHUHGWKDW%DUWKRX¶V
statements were not conform to the views of the political department of 
WKH4XDLG¶2UVD\7KHQKHDGGHGWKDWLQKLVRSLQLRQWKH)UHQFK3UHPLHU
would strive to ÄVORZO\FRUUHFW´ WKHHIIHFWVRI%DUWKRX¶VVSHHFK36 
Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ UHSRUWHG RI WKH HIIHFWV RQ WKH )UHQFK-Hungarian 
relations folloZLQJ %DUWKRX¶V WULS WR Bucharest and Belgrade, too. 
According to him it was not a surprise that Barthou strongly underlined 
the steadfastness of the ÄLittle (QWHQWH´ alliance and   took a stand 
against revision. The Hungarian envoy to Paris was convinced that the 
JRDO RI %DUWKRX¶V YLVLWV ZDV WR strengthen the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ as the 
central piece of an eventually greater East-European block and to kill 
sympathies toward Germany emerging in Yugoslavia and Romania. 
%DUWKRX¶VSHUIRUPDQFH LQBucharest was not welcome in Paris ± wrote 
Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ DQG DGGHG VRPH SROLWLFLDQ IHDUV WKDW %DUWKRX¶V
endeavors will harm the slowly improving French-Italian relations and 
will push Europe to break into two antagonistic block.37 
On the next ordinary session of the Hungarian parliament before the 
order of the day a number of deputies took the floor owing to the storm 
raising statement of the Finch foreign minister. The deputies 
condemned the sudden French turn-about in unison and they pointed 
out that Barthou followed a saber-rattling policy instead of international 
common consent and poisoned the relations between the Danube states. 
)ROORZLQJ WKH SDVVLRQDWH UHPDUNV )RUHLJQ PLQLVWHU .iQ\D UHDG DORXG
3ULPH PLQLVWHU *|PE|V¶V GHFODUDWLRQ Ä%DUWKRX¶V VWDWHPHQWV FUHDWHG
general uproar. Till up to now Hungarian political circles has been 
convinced that the goal of the French government foreign policy to ease 
present tensions has not been based on bayonets but based on justice. 
%DUWKRX¶V VWDWHPHQWV NLOOHG WKRVH KRSHV 7KH +XQJDULDQ government 
                                                             
35 3HVWL+tUODS-22 Jun. 1933. 
36 HNA K 63 1934-11/1. 25 Jun. 1934. 
37 HNA K 63 1934 -11/1. 4 Jul. 1934.  
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pursues peaceful policy and it endeavors to obtain its goals by pacific 
means ± VR LWZLOOEH LQ WKH IXWXUH WRR´ The government understands 
the indignation ± VDLG.iQ\D± but it is important that nor the deputies 
neither their voters do not loose their cold- blood. (The voters lost their 
cold-blood because a series of manifestation was organized against 
Barthou and France.) 
Such a drastic turn-about of the French politics toward the Danube-
basin did not remain unnoticed. The foreign press correspondents to 
Paris brought it forward. Barthou made the following confidential 
remarks to the journalists: After the world war Hungary heavily 
damaged French interests twice. First they attacked the French currency 
through criminal offense under the guidance of the Transylvanian count 
Bethlen. France has always been the home and self-scarifying defendant 
RI KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG IUHHGRP DJDLQVW RWKHUV )UDQFH VKRXOGQ¶W EH
supposed to bring back the feudal spirit to Transylvania which employed 
counterfeiting against France. In front of those practices stands the 
5RPDQLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLWLFVLPSULQWHGE\WKHSULQFLSOHVRIWKHKLJK
ideas about the human liberty of the French genius and the nationalities 
of Transylvania will very soon experience with satisfaction the difference 
between the two mentalities. And Hungary has been gravely hurting 
French interests right now when under the influence of this 
7UDQV\OYDQLDQFRXQWWULHVWRJDWKHU)UDQFH¶VHQHPLHV7KHGDUNLQWULJXHV
of Hungarian diplomats do not shade France¶VH\HV 
,I+XQJDU\LV+LWOHU¶VWRDG\GRQRWDSSHDOWRKXPDQULJKWVDQGMXVWLFH
because the new German regime is equal with the most inhuman injustice 
and unlawfulness. Germany will always exist when nobody will remember 
Hitler. Germany will have to repair much more if it forgets this truth. The 
stronger is Hitler the weaker is Germany. France is strong today and will be 
strong tomorrow. Romania has made a better choice as for its principles 
and friends then its Central-Western neighbor. Mussolini is without doubts 
one of the greatest statesmen of Europe but Italy is not the protector of 
small states38 ± finished his statement the French foreign minister.  
However Laval who followed Barthou did not differ in opinion with his 
predecessor, at most he expressed it in subtler manner. At the end of the 
year the Hungarian foreign minister met Laval in Geneva. Laval thought 
that the murder of king Alexander and Barthou in Marseilles did not 
provoked storms on the level of French-Hungarian political relations 
although there was a very intensive press campaign against Hungary. Laval 
GZHOWRQWKHTXHVWLRQRIUHYLVLRQDQGWROG.iQ\DWKH+XQJDULDQSURSDJDQGD
was too noisy, it had been making continuously trouble and he added he 
considered unavoidable to stop it for the years to come. The borders were 
the consequences of the war and they must be accepted peacefully and 
                                                             
38 HNA K 63 1934-11/1. Manuscript without date and signiture. 
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dignity as France did it after 1871. (It was certainly not true, the French 
SROLWLFV¶RQO\JRDOZDVWKHUHYHQJHDIWHU39 The French foreign minister 
- just to avoid misunderstanding - VWDWHGWRWKHFKDUJpG¶DIIDLUHVRI%XOJDULD
± which followed revisionist goals, too ± that Ä7KHPRVWLPSRUWDQWWKLQJLV
that no one should change the peace treaties because they were the 
sturdiest base lays the European ordeURQ´40 
It became more and more clear to the Hungarian government that 
the French position was not changing and Paris would be less and less 
inclined to take into consideration the Hungarian views. Albeit the 
French M.P. Ernest Pezet one of the leading expert of the Central-
European region stated that the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ - put into the position of 
the arbiter of the Danube-basin questions - was characterized by its old 
KDWUHGGLVWUXVWDQGSROLWLFVRILVRODWLRQ.iQ\DLQGLFDWHGWKHSUREOHPWR
Laval in Geneva, also saying that if Paris had been interested in the 
Danube Pact henceforward it should have done everything to persuade 
the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ to recognize the equality of Hungary41 - in the 
absence of this recognition Hungary could not sign the Danube Pact. 
(Later in front of the Foreign Affaires Committee of the Hungarian 
SDUOLDPHQW .iQ\D PDGH LW FOHDU WKDW Hungary could not but as an 
independent and absolutely equal ± thus militarily, too ± nation to take 
its seat at the negotiating WDEOH ZLWK WKH Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ /DYDO WROG
.iQ\D WKDW Ä3RXU REWHQLU O¶pJDOLWp GHV GURLWV LO IDXGUDLW GRQQHU GHV
JDUDQWLHV VXSSOpPHQWDLUHV´ 2Q .iQ\D¶V TXHVWLRQ GLG WKH )UHQFK
Premier understand by his statement a mutual assistance agreement the 
answer was Ä<HV´ .iQ\D¶VUHaction was (no wonder) that in this case the 
Danube Pact would not be realized because it was absolutely excluded 
that Hungary sign a mutual assistance agreement with states which 
GLVPHPEHUHGLWVWHUULWRU\/DYDOGLGQ¶WDQVZHU42   
2QHRI/DYDO¶VUHPDUNVWR .iQ\DÄYRXVrWHVXQSHWLWvORWFXULHX[GDQV
O¶(XURSHFHQWUDOHPDLVPDOKHXUHXVHPHQWYRXVrWHVWUqVV\PSDWKLTXH´43 
VKRZ YHU\ FRQYLQFLQJO\ WKDW WKH )UHQFK IRUHLJQ PLQLVWHU KDGQ¶W WKH
slightest idea about the gravity of the situation. The Hungarian envoy to 
Paris rightly pointed out that Paris ÄLVXQDEOHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKDW)UDQFH¶V
DGYHUVDU\ FDQ KDYH OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVWV WRR ZKLFK RSSRVH )UDQFH¶V
LQWHUHVWV´44 Later he added that Hitler introducing the general compulsive 
military service tore to pieces the military provisions of the Versailles 
treaties and opened a new area in the history of the postwar politics.45 
                                                             
39 idem, 7 Dec. 1934. 
40 idem, the report of Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ 
41 The main problem from this point of view was the equal rights to rearmament. 
42 HNA K 63 1935 ± 11/7 ± 6 Febr. and 12 Sept. 1935. 
43 idem 6 Febr. 1935. 
44 HNA K 63 11/1-  18 Jan. 1935.  
45 idem, 26 March 1935. 
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And some Hungarian public opinion influencing paper openly wrote 
that Hungary was standing by the ÄSHDFH RI 5RPH´ because ÄWKH
extraordinary merit oI 5RPH¶V IULHQGO\ JURXSLQJ LV WKDW LW KDV LQ
principle broken the almost alone dominating French foreign policy 
which wanted to make eternal the postwar situation and wanted to 
HWHUQDOL]HWKHPHQDFHDQGGDQJHURIZDU7KHJRDORI5RPH¶VSROLWLFVLV
to erodHDQGWRUHYLVHWKH9HUVDLOOHVWUHDWLHV´46 
Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ LQ KLV VKDUS-eyed summary report on France 
FRQFOXGHG WKDW )UDQFH¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ ZHUH FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ WKH
intransigent nationalism, the endeavor to European supremacy and the 
fear of the growing German power. Its most important goal was to create 
a coalition against Germany and to weaken with every possible mean 
those countries, which did not want to fit themselves into the framework 
of the French influence. In addition to this goal her aim would be the 
GHILQLWLYHVHFXULQJRI WKH9HUVDLOOHV WUHDWLHVDQG*HUPDQ\¶V LVRODWLRQ LQ
the future, too. As for Germany it did not want to comply with the 
changing circumstances and stood rigidly by the Versailles peace dictate. 
France strove to cut off Germany from the rest of Europe. 
The French-Hungarian relations are worsening ± continued the 
Hungarian envoy to Paris ± as according to the French perception 
Hungary was the exponent of German politics in Central-Europe. Laval 
keeps on the anti-Hungarian line of Barthou, considerably backing the 
anti-Hungarian actions of Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia 
following the Marseilles assassination of King Alexander and Barthou. 
The revisionist politics of the Hungarian government push even harder 
the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ toward France. This cooperation was given a new 
tool by the creation of the Balkan pact. France unconditionally serves the 
interest of the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ The French approach to Italy partly 
serves the goal to distance Italy from Hungary and on the pretext of 
improving the Central-(XURSHDQVLWXDWLRQWRIRUFH+XQJDU\¶VSODFHLQWR
a Central-Europe, reorganized according the interests of the Ä/LWWOH
(QWHQWH´. The purpose of the French government is to freeze the 
international order created by the Trianon treaties ± closed his report 
Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ (YHQ WKH HFRQRPLF WLHV IHOO EDFN 7KH +XQJDULDQ
export in 1934 to France was 35 million francs against the 80 million of 
the previous year. The import from France was 26 million francs against 
the 49 million of the previous year.47 
The remilitarization of Rhine-land put new burdens on the French-
Hungarian relations. On his demand Foreign PLQLVWHU .iQ\D UHFHLYHG
the French envoy to Budapest. According to the note taken of the 
meeting the French envoy Maugras was sulky with the Hungarian press 
which following their first objective comments on the German move 
                                                             
46 0DJ\DU.OSROLWLNDQR±11, 1934. 
47 HNA K 63 11/1, 15 Jan. 1935. (These were insignificant volumes.) 
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published enthusiastic articles about the German ÄDFWRI OLEHUDWLRQ´. It 
seems ± he said ± that the Hungarian government set free the press 
ÄZKLFKUHYHDOVZLWKRut restraint the true sentiments of the government 
DQG WKDW RI WKH SXEOLF RSLQLRQ´ There was certain part of truth in 
0DXJUDV¶VFRPSODLQWVLHWKHSUHVVSXEOLVKHG+LWOHU¶VVSHHFKin full and 
their comments suggested that the way indicated by Germany led toward 
the revision of Versailles. 
.iQ\D¶V DQVZHU GLGQ¶W OHDYH DQ\ GRXEW DV IRU WKH LQWHQWLRQV RI WKH
Hungarian government. He declared that the Hungarian government 
did have neither the possibility nor the reason to take a stand in this 
recent French-German discord. Hungary is not ± he said ± a signatory 
state of the Locarno treaty and is not a member of the League of Nations 
Council. And not without irony he added that France rather gave this 
distinction to such world power like Portugal, Uruguay and Panama with 
pleasure. The sole and unique wish of the Hungarian government ± he 
went on ± was that peace be preserved and the concerned powers find a 
solution for the newly emerged conflict, a solution which wouldQ¶W
overwhelm with a new armed collision as Europe struggled with great 
GLIILFXOWLHV.iQ\DFORVHGKLVUHPDUNVDGGLQJWKDWWKHDUWLFOHVRIWKHWK
RI 0DUFK LVVXH RI %XGDSHVWL +tUODS DQG 3HVWHU /OR\G H[SUHVVHG WKH
above-mentioned opinion and ÄZHUH LQVSLUHG E\ P\VHOI´.48 Two days 
ODWHU.iQ\DJDYHinstructions to the Hungarian envoy to Paris as for the 
handling of the Rhine-land conflict stating that the Hungarian 
government wished to keep its distance. He added the whole Hungarian 
public opinion warmly wished that the crisis be solved fulfilling the 
desire of the concerned powers as soon as possible. Ä7KH +XQJDULDQ
government hope that our neighboring countries will show similar 
UHVWUDLQWRWKLVFRQIOLFWDQGZRQ¶WXVHWKLVRSSRUWXQLW\WRGHPRQVWUDWH
against Hungary´49- FORVHGKLVLQVWUXFWLRQV.iQ\D 
French-Hungarian relations were deteriorating in accelerating 
rhythm. It was perfectly revealed by the debate about the freshly 
introduced Austrian compulsory military service. When the French 
envoy to Budapest inquired after the Hungarian government intentions 
concerning a possible imitation of the example of the Austrian 
compulsory military service the deputy Foreign minister told him that 
the Hungarian government would not imitate the Austrian example ± 
for the time being.50 Maugras was not satisfied with this answer and 
VRPH ZHHNV ODWHU KH DVNHG .iQ\D WKH VDPH TXHVWLRQ ± of course 
knowing very well that one of the gravest problems of the Hungarian-
Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ relation was the question of ÄWKH WRWDO ±first of all 
military ± HTXDOLW\´   
                                                             
48 HNA K 63, 11/7, 10 March.1936. 
49 idem 12 March 1936. 
50 idem 2 Apr. 1936. 
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.iQ\DGLGQ¶WDQVZHUWKe question but expressed that according to his 
information the French government advised its allies to calm down 
concerning the Austrian step. But if the Habsburg restoration would be 
put on the order of the day in Vienna or Hungary would introduce the 
compulsory military service Paris made it clear that the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ 
states could totally count on France WR ZUHFN WKHVH SODQV .iQ\D
expressed his regrets for France was employing double standards i.e. it 
brought forward the special theory that international treaties were not 
equally binding for every signatory states.51 
The Hungarian doubts were not but strengthened toward the French 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V Great Power position and foreign policy by the fact that 
HYHQ WKH 4XDL G¶2UVD\ HFKRHG YLHZV ZKLFK FRQVLGHUHG the Ä/LWWOH
(QWHQWH´ as a ÄG\LQJ LQVWLWXWLRQ´ not able to stop the Anschluss. 
According to certain opinions about Romania this latter never meant a 
serious political and military factor for France.52 The result of those 
doubts was that France as an alternative to Italy or Germany was quite 
quickly abandoned by the planners of the Hungarian foreign policy. This 
process of changing was accelerated by French views exposed in 
Budapest e.g. by Christian democrat M.P. Ernest Pezet deputy chairman 
of the Foreign affairs committee of the French National Assembly.53  
The French M.P. was obviously received on high level in the Foreign 
PLQLVWU\ EHFDXVH WKH SHUPDQHQW GHSXW\ IRUHLJQ PLQLVWHU *iERU $SRU
himself sent a long report to the Chairman of the Hungarian League of 
RHYLVLRQDERXW3H]HW¶VGHFODUDWLRQV7KHFRUHRIZKLFKZDV WKHZDU LQ
Europe cannot be avoided and Germany will unleash it. The Anschluss is 
equal with the imminent death of Czechoslovakia and for this reason 
France will be involved into this conflict. ParLV¶ position is complicated 
by the fact that the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ VWDWHV GRQ¶W WDNH an unambiguous 
stand as for the question of Anschluss. The French politicians are 
amazingly under-informed about the problems of the Danube-basin, and 
WKH 4XDL G¶2UVD\ VWLOl stick to its outmoded conceptions. All of the 
French politicians knowing Central-Europe think that the Habsburg 
restoration is the only solution to stop the Anschluss. 
Pezet pointed out that France was not able to give economic 
advantages to the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ any more. Slowly Germany replaces 
France and the political consequences of this move will be the German 
orientation of the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ The divergences of opinion (Anschluss, 
restoration) put an end to the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ as a united political power. 
Yugoslavia cannot carry along France with Her into a war in spite of the 
fact that there are agreements between the French and Yugoslav armed 
                                                             
51 idem 7 Apr. 1936. 
52 idem 4 Apr. 1936. 
53 He was an important personality of the French social-catholicism, specialist of 
Central-and Eastern Europe. 
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forces Headquarters but they can be activated only in special 
circumstances and can be easily outwitted. The Czechs have another 
position; in their case a full-fledged military agreement exists according to 
which a war against the Czechs or a war launched by Czechoslovakia will 
draw France into a war. Romania is not trusted because of Her intrigues, 
panamas and unreliability but despite of this reality the French 
JRYHUQPHQWGRHVQ¶WZDQWWRDFFHSWWKHIDFWWKDWWKHÄ/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ is no 
more the force She counted with. Pezet gave voice to his belief that a 
rapprochement would take place very soon between Italy and Germany. 
Pezet thought that according to leading French political circles 
Hungary was and would be the ally of Germany. Hungary lays so 
deeply in the German danger zone that Budapest is unable to pursue 
GLIIHUHQW SROLWLFV WKXV +XQJDU\ GRHVQ¶W UHSUHVHnt any advantage for 
France ± said Pezet. Moreover Hungary was jeopardizing peace in 
Central-Europe by its revisionist claims and is backing the German 
revisionist endeavors against France. 
According to Pezet Hungary has followed a false tactic as for revision. 
+XQJDU\VKRXOGQ¶WKDYH demanded revision but should have clung to the 
exact implementation of the principles of the Trianon treaty and on the 
basis of those principles to demand the fulfillment of the Ä:LOVRQLDQ
SULQFLSOH´ i.e. the realization of border revision, which reflects the real 
ethnic situation. Ä7KLV LV RI FRXUVH DQ DQWLTXDWHG SRVLWLRQ ,W LV QRW
possible to touch WKLVTXHVWLRQZLWKRXWZDUDQ\PRUH´ ± he continued. 
Hungary follows so closely the German perception of revision that 
interdictions against Germany concern Hungary, too. But for Germany 
there are no but territorial restrictions meanwhile there are no 
concessions for Hungary at all. In 3H]HW¶VRSLQLRQ Hungary would be in 
an awkward position when the German influence would prevail in 
Yugoslavia and Romania. These states would be more important for 
Germany than Hungary and it can easily happen that Germany would 
force Budapest to renounce to lay claim to its former territories annexed 
by Yugoslavia and Romania. (And this prediction ensued because Berlin 
backed Hungarian claims only against Czechoslovakia ± and urged good 
relations with the two others countries.) 
Pezet concluded his thoughts saying that Hungary missed the train of 
cooperation with the Western powers and these latters would leave 
Hungary alone. Anyway the claim of territorial changes would result in war. 
Because in these problems Czechoslovakia was involved France would be 
pushed toward intervention independently of its yearning for peace. In his 
view a new world war would broke out in the shortest time.54 
Paris displease with the activity of the Hungarian diplomacy was 
HDUPDUNHG E\ +RUWK\¶V YLVLW WR $XVWULD DQG %DYDULD 7KH +XQJDULDQ
                                                             
54 HNA K 63 11/7 ± without date 1936. 
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decision makers did not attach exaggerated importance to the French 
views since they thought: Ä7KH)UHQFKGLSORPDF\GRHVQ¶WDFNQRZOHGJH
that its hegemony which forced the Hungarian foreign policy to wait 
DQGDEVWDLQLQJIURPLQLWLDWLYHVGRHVQRWH[LVWDQ\PRUH´55 At the same 
time parts of public opinion ascertained with relief that ÄWKHDVFHQGDQF\ 
the authoritative self-confidence with which France was trying to 
conduct (XURSH¶Vaffairs EHORQJVWRWKHSDVW´56 
Independently of the above mentioned UHPDUNV 'DUiQ\L WKH QHZ
Premier ± indicating to the Western democracies that the German 
option is only a possibility for the moment ±hurried to instruct in a 
coded message Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ZKRZDVJRLQJ WR WKH)UHQFK IRUHLJQ
minister to tell him the foreign policy of the new Hungarian government 
was unchanged. Hungary keeps on cultivating its friendships but it 
GRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDW it LVQ¶W ORRNLQJ IRUDJRRGSDUWQHUVKLSZLWKGLIIHUHQW
states. It is true first of all for France since there is no direct antagonism 
between the two countries. It must be sincerely acknowledged that the 
Hungarian-Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ relations are not the best ± but tensions have 
been lessening with Yugoslavia. 
To ameliorate relations with the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ has become more 
difficult by the fact that they have taken a very stiff standpoint 
concerning the question of equality. The military equality and the 
treatment of Hungarian minority were problems, which separated 
Hungary from the Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ countries. The good counseling by 
France especially in relation with Romania could help a lot. Without the 
settlement of those problems the economic cooperation with the Ä/LWWOH
(QWHQWH´was hardly imaginable ± although Budapest did not exclude it 
in principle. 
It is to be underlined that ÄRXUIULHQGO\UHODWLRQV´ were not directed 
against anybody and except for the well know Ä3DFWRI5RPH´ Budapest 
had no other treaties ± and this fact proved that the political goals of 
Hungary were peaceful. If the ÄERUGHU TXHVWLRQ´ turns up Khuen-
+pGHUYiU\ VKRXOG VWDWH WKDW+XQJDU\ GRHVQ¶WZDQW WR YLROHQWO\ modify 
the existing borders ± but it is impossible to recognize once more the 
status quo. To sign a mutual assistance treaty with the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ 
countries cannot be done by the well-known reasons.57 
The Hungarian government could not progress further into this 
direction. On the one hand the situation Khuen-+pGHUYiU\DQDO\]HG LQ
his political report was absolutely obvious: Ä7KH \HDU RI  LV
FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\WKHGHFD\RI)UDQFH¶VKHJHPRQ\7KHH[SDQVLRQRIWKH
German and Italian might exercises great attraction onto states 
JURXSHG DURXQG )UDQFH´ The paramount political goal of Paris 
                                                             
55 idem 27 Aug. 1936. 
56 No 3±0DJ\DU.OSROLWLND. 
57 HNA K 63 11/7 -14 Oct. 1936. 
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henceforward is to build its own security system. Though France 
swallowed the pill of the remilitarization of the Rheine-land but 
presented a peace plan, which was also unacceptable for Hungary. The 
limitation of rearmament by regional mutual assistance treaties and the 
statement that the revision of the (Versailles) treaties are necessary but 
such a revisionist proposal concerning the territorial order of Europe 
cannot be put on the order of the day before 25 years58 - was absolutely 
inadmissible for Hungary. 
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH 4XDL G¶2UVDy did not turned deaf ears to 
RoPDQLD¶VZDUQLQJVLHLWFDQQRWEHLQWKHLQWHUHVWRI)UDQFHWRDPHOLRUDWH
the Hungarian-Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ relations for the simple reason that the 
motive of the creation of Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ was the Anti-Hungarian union of 
the member states. If those relations ameliorate, the mere existence of the 
Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ will be contestable and this development GRHVQ¶W VHUYH
)UDQFH¶V DLPV59 The Ä/LWWOH (QWHQWH´ lobby was so strong that Foreign 
minister Delbos was vainly repeating the necessity of a settlement with 
Hungary and it was for nothing that certain French political circles showed 
JUHDWGLVLOOXVLRQWRZDUGWKHÄ/LWWOH(QWHQWH´± the position of this later was 
untouchable. What is more the French premier wanted to stop the 
armament shipping to the extreme rightwing Romanian Goga government 
in vain ± he had to cede under the pressure of the Quai G¶2UVD\ DQG 
(apparently) the ministry of Defense. And all of this was done in spite of the 
greatest illusion of the postwar French diplomacy i.e. Paris was convinced 
that Romania and Yugoslavia could be used in a war against Germany ± 
was Khuen-+pGHUYiU\¶VRSLQLRQ60 
+H DOVR SRLQWHG RXW WKDW WKH )UHQFK IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GLGQ¶W decide to 
VWDUW QHJRWLDWLRQV WR KHDU +XQJDU\¶V FODLPV DW OHDVW 7KH )UHQFK
diplomacy was characterized by passivity into the direction of Budapest. 
This passivity was eased under the influence of Prague but the fact that 
England began to witness greater interest toward Austria and Hungary 
played some role, too. The activity of the Hungarian government had 
EHHQMXGJHGE\DSRVLWLYHPDQQHUDQG3DULVGLGQ¶Wexclude the possibility 
of Hungarian-Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ talks so dear for France. At the same time 
France made some smaller economic gesture with pleasure to 
counterbalance the German influence. The totality of the French-
Hungarian commercial exchange presented a growth of 40% relative to 
the previous year. The Hungarian export to France jumped to 80 
thousand francs from the level of 50 thousand. (This was of course 
insignificant volume.) 
The Anschluss and the German-Czechoslovak conflict proved that 
                                                             
58 idem K 63. 11/1 Jan. 1937. Report of the Hungarian envoy to Paris. 
59 idem 14 Okt. 1937. Khuen-+pGHUYiU\¶VUHSRUWRQKLVFKDQJHRIYLHZZLWKWKH
Czechoslovak foreing minister in Paris. 
60 HNA K 63 1938.1/1. 6 Jan. 1938. 
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France had totally lost its capability to launch strategic initiatives and it 
could not handle the invasive German foreign policy at all. 
Independently of this fact the dialogue concerning the problems of the 
Danube region was upheld ± with a special regard on the expansion of 
the German Reich and the revisionist policy of Hungary.  
The German ambassador to Paris raised the Sudetenland problem at 
WKH 4XDL G¶2UVD\ DQG VDLG WKDW WKH LQWUDQVLJHQW EHKDYLRU RI WKH
Czechoslovak government would push Paris into a conflict with 
*HUPDQ\7KH)UHQFKIRUHLJQPLQLVWHU%RQQHW¶VVROHPQDQVZHUZDVWKDW
France had not the slightest intention ÄWR EH EOLQGO\ OHG E\
&]HFKRVORYDNLD´ and he would tell his counterparts in Prague that 
France would be forced to revise its alliance treaty with Czechoslovakia if 
this later would not fulfill at least 80% of the just claims of its national 
minorities.61 France had been slowly drifting away from the 
mainstreams of the European political courses and this fact had 
surprising effects i.e. Paris put aside the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWHVSHFWDFOHV´ when 
was examining the Hungarian revisionist policy.62 (It was certainly true 
only for a part of the French political actors.) 
Ferenc Honti chief representative of the Paris bureau of the 
Hungarian League of Revision had a long talk with Jean Mistler former 
minister, M.P. of the Radical Party and deputy chairman of the foreign 
affaires committee of the Parliament. Mistrel told Honti that to stop the 
German expansion an Austrian-Hungarian-Czech trio would be the 
better solution. Since the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ did not exist anymore - he said 
± and if Hungary would play a role in this trio there would be no 
difficulty for France to fully back Hungary against Romania.63 What 
0LVWUHOVDLGGLGQ¶WPLUURUWKHRIILFLDOYLHZRIWKH)UHQFKJRYHUQPHQW,W
ZDVPXFK FORVHU WR WKH )UHQFK HQYR\ WR %XGDSHVW¶V YLHZ SUHVHQWHG WR
.iQ\D7KH4XDLG¶2UVD\ WKRXJKW WKDW+XQJDU\FRXOGQRWKDPPHURXW
an agreement with Czechoslovakia without the German green light and 
Berlin would never give such an agreement.64 
In the summer of 1938 Ernest Pezet revisited Hungary but this 
occasion he was received in the foreign ministry only by a subaltern 
diplomat. According to this latter, 3H]HW¶V YLHZ FRQFHUQLQJ WKH UHJLRQ
DQG HVSHFLDOO\+XQJDU\¶V endeavors had been modified ± but this fact 
GLGQ¶W KDYH DQ\ LPSRUWDQFH LQ the summer of 1938. Pezet stated that 
following the Anschluss the French public opinion realized that this 
                                                             
61 HNA K 63 1938.11/1. 10 Apr. 1938. The German ambassador to Paris gave 
these informations to Khuen-+pGHUYiU\7KH)UHQFKDPEDVVDGRUWR%HUOLQ)UDQoois-
3RQFHW PDGH D YHU\ VLPLODU UHPDUN WR 6]WyMDL WKH +XQJDULDQ HQYR\ WR %HUOLQ Ä,W
ZRXOGQ¶WEHZRUWKZKLOHWRJRWRZDUIRU&]HFKRVORYDNLD´ (13 Aug. 1938.) 
62 HNA K63 1938. 11/7. 6 Jan. 1938. 
63 idem. 6 Febr. 1938. 
64 idem. 21 March 1938. 
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event endangered the French insistence to ÄVpFXULWp´,Q3DULV¶VYLHZWKH
IXUWKHUJURZWKRI*HUPDQ\¶VWHUULWRU\ZDVRXWRITXHVWLRQand thus the 
Hungarian hope for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was false. 
The Hungarian diplomat closed his note with the following remark: 
´3H]HWLVXQGHUWRWDO&]HFKLQIOXHQFHDQGKHFRQVLGHUVWRKHOSWKH&]HFK
JRYHUQPHQWLV)UDQFH¶VYLWDOLQWHUHVW´65 
The dramatic events of the year 1938 noticeably strengthened the self-
confidence of the Hungarian government. In August Horthy paid a call on 
Hitler and at the Hungarian-Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ conference in Bled, Budapest 
was given green light as for rearmament. The wind of the quickly changing 
circumstances filled the sails of the Hungarian foreign policy. It became an 
official view that if Hitler would be given the Sudetenland Hungary must 
SXW IRUZDUG LWV WHUULWRULDO FODLPVDJDLQVW&]HFKRVORYDNLD7KHUHIRUH.iQ\D
asked the French envoy to come to his office. He informed him that the 
Hungarian government would consider very dangerous whatever solution 
could lead to the discrimination of the Hungarian minority.  
Without the compliance with all of the just claim of all national minority 
in Czechoslovakia the order could not be restored and it goes without saying 
that every discriminatory solution at the expense of the Hungarian minority 
would result in a very tense relation between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
The Hungarian government had been following a rather peaceful and not 
bellicose policy until up to now ± VDLG.iQ\D66 
The participants of the Munich bargain considering the Hungarian 
and Polish claims made a proposal to Budapest of treating with Prague, 
WRR7KH+XQJDULDQJRYHUQPHQWVWDUWHGWRQHJRWLDWHEXWZDVQ¶WVDWLVILHG 
with the progress of it. The French envoy to Budapest was informed that 
the way of progress of these negotiations was bad and the opposite side 
manifestly followed delaying tactics.67  
After Munich the French public opinion had a positive opinion about 
HunJDU\¶VEHKDYLRU± ÄWKHSUHYDLOLQJPRRGLVGHILQLWHO\JRRG´ reported 
Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ $V KH DVFHUWDLQHG, the politicians and the public 
opinion absolutely agreed that the reattachment of Hungarian speaking 
territories to Hungary was a natural move. The positive judgment of 
Hungary came from the violent behavior of Poland, which caused 
general indignation and bitterness. Poland abused the desperate 
situation of another ally of France and occupied the disputed territories 
meanwhile Hungary ± said the French ± show a civilized and calm 
behavior ± they set down to the table to negotiate. On the one hand the 
French was sorry for the Czechs on the other they hoped that after 
0XQLFK WKH\ ZRXOGQ¶W KDYH WRPDNH IXUWKHU VDFULILFH IRU WKHP $W WKH
same time the liquidation of the Czech question and the Czecho-
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66 idem 19 Sept. 1938. 
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+XQJDULDQ WDONV LQ .RPiURP GLGQ¶W DURXVH WKH FXULRVLW\ RI SXEOLF
opinion.68 The first Munich verdict (which definitively sealed the fate of 
the French system of alliance formed in the Danube basin) was qualified 
a great Hungarian success in the French press- according to the report of 
the Hungarian envoy to Paris. Hungary got back a bigger territory then it 
counted on. A number of newspaper expressed satisfaction over the fact 
that France could avoid to participate in these decisions.69 
Without any doubt all that happened proved the rightfulness of its 
policy of revision followed for twenty years for the Hungarian 
government. This conviction was supported by the arguments presented 
GXULQJ WKH GHEDWH RQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V foreign policy at the French 
National Assembly. In his intervention Ernest Pezet developed the idea 
that the JRYHUQPHQWVZKLFKGLGQ¶WZDQW to admit that a moderate border 
revision in the spirit of mutual concession would had been the primary 
condition of all healthy organization in the Danube valley bore the 
responsibility for the given situation. The failure of peaceful settlement 
gave Hungary a very advantageous position and ÄLW LV WR IHDU WKDW WKH
Hungarian government avails the dynamism of its revisionism and 
will turn it against Romania´ An obliging gesture to Hungary can 
prevent such a move ± he said. The further progress of the debate 
suggested to Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ WKDW )UDQFH SUDFWLFDOO\ GLGQ¶W FRQVLGHU
anymore the French-Czechoslovak alliance or the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ alive.70 
In his annual political report Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ ZDV ULJKW ZKHQ KH
ascertained that the international prestige of France had been gradually 
deteriorating. After the Anschluss the French government run away. French 
political circles had recognized yet that the growing German influence into 
the Danube valley had been fundamentally threatening the French system 
of alliance built up after the war. Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ FRUUHFWO\ HVWDEOLVKHG
that the French foreign policy became settled by two lines. 
The first one was personalized by Flandin71 who sent his best wishes 
to Hitler after Munich. This group disclaimed the postwar military 
treaties and the thesis of military assistance. They thought that fallowing 
the repudiation of the Locarno treaty and the non-application of the 16-
point RI WKH /HDJXH RI 1DWLRQV¶ treaty; )UDQFH¶V REOLJDWLRQ WRZDUG WKH
Czechs did not exist anymore. They wanted to avoid to be pushed to war 
by foreign interests. On this side there was a very strong criticism 
against the post-war settlements and show a new sensibility for the 
necessity of the realization of the border revisions by peaceful means. 
On the other hand the official - called ÄZDUIRPHQWLQJ´ - standpoint of the 
                                                             
68 HNA 1938. K63 11/1 ± 11. Okt. 1938. 
69 idem 12 Nov. 1938. 
70 HNA 1939. K 63 11/1 .27 Jan. 1939. 
71 He was the French Foreign Minister when Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland 
 in 1936. 
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4XDLG¶2UVD\ZDVWKDWWKH/RFDUQRWUHDW\OLYHGDVZHOODV)UDQFH¶VREOLJDWLRQV
toward the League of Nations thus the French-Czechoslovak treaty was fully 
LQIRUFH)UDQFHZRXOGQ¶WJLYH+HUDFFRUGWR*HUPDQ\¶VH[SDQVLRQWRWKH(DVW
to known Her colonies in security. The security of the French colonies must 
be assured in Europe and that was the reason of sticking to the treaties with 
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Ä/LWWOH(QWHQWH´ 
Khuen-+pGHUYiU\GUDZWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKH)UHQFKSXEOLFopinion 
agreed with Munich but did not realized that over the ruins of Versailles 
the mighty new Germany assumed hegemonic position for itself. France 
only assisting to the most important decision-making processed looked 
helpless to the Vienna verdict i.e. the partial revision of the Trianon 
treaties and the reattachment of some Hungarian ethnic territories to 
Hungary. As for the Balkans the French diplomacy considers the Ä/LWWOH
EntentH´DQRQ-existing entity. France practically has given up its East-
European positions ± nailed down the Hungarian envoy to Paris. 
In this situation we cannot speak about active political relations ± 
wrote Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ 7KH )UHQFK SUHVV SXEOLVKHG PXFK PRUH
positive articles that before about Hungary, the public opinion show 
PRUH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ IRU +XQJDU\¶V SUREOHPV 2IILFLDO Fircles thought 
SUREDEOH WKDW LQ FDVH RIZDU+XQJDU\ZRXOGQ¶W EH DEOH WR avoid being 
EHOOLJHUHQW RQ *HUPDQ\¶V VLGH 'XULQJ WKH &]HFK-Hungarian conflict 
Paris advised Prague a peaceful approach concerning the discord with 
Hungary. After Munich the French forHLJQ SROLF\ GLGQ¶W ZLWQHVV DQ\
interest to East-European problems consequently France did not 
participate in the redrawing of the Czech-Hungarian borderline, so it 
ceded this task to the Axis ± concluded his annual report Khuen-
+pGHUYiU\72  
One could have drawn the conclusion of what occurred on the 
European political scene that the planners of the Hungarian foreign 
policy ÄZURWH GRZQ´ France, too. Independently of that fact the 
Hungarian legation to Paris followed with great interest what was 
happening in France, registered the positive or negative opinions about 
Hungary - although LW GLGQ¶W EHDU DQ\ LPSRUWDQFH IRU %XGDSHVW DQ\
more. As Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ UHSRUWHG DERXW WKH \HDU RI  IROORZLQJ
the falling in decay of Czechoslovakia France discovered that it had to 
SUHSDUH ZDU WR VWRS WKH *HUPDQ H[SDQVLRQ ,Q WKH RSSRVLWH FDVH ÄWKH
German Reich will try to realize it world conquering plans which for the 
PRPHQWVHHPDPXGGOHGLGHD´± he stated.   
He added that the French-Hungarian relations were showing a 
gradually improving tendency following the disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia (France did not recognized the new Slovak state). France 
DFFHSWHG +XQJDU\¶V DFWLRQ WR reattach Transcarpathia without any 
                                                             
72 idem. 5 Febr. 1939.  
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protest even Paris was satisfied EHFDXVH +XQJDU\¶V PRYH KDG WKe 
V\PSDWK\ RI 3RODQG DQG RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH 4XDL G¶2UVD\ WKRXJKW
that the armed ÄH[SHGLWLRQ´ GLGQ¶WKDYH+LWOHU¶VDFFRUG, but was executed 
against his will ± wrote Khuen-+pGHUYiU\:KDWZDVPRUH, the French 
public opinion felt drawn to Hungary since this later did not participate 
in the war against Poland ± albeit Paris foreshow the opposite ± and the 
Hungarian government GLGQ¶WSHUPLW*HUPDQ\WRPDUFKDFURVV+XQJDU\
to Poland and Romania. The French government wanted rather to help 
this kind of Hungarian neutrality then hinder and that was why it 
disapproved all sign showing temporary deteriorating Hungarian-
Romanian relations. They tried to improve French-Hungarian relations 
(although 3DULVGLGQ¶W SHUPLW WKHRSHQLQJof a Hungarian consulate in 
Lille) ± according to Khuen-+pGHUYiU\73 But of course at that time all of 
this change was of no importance at all. 
After the collapse of France the Hungarian legation moved ± 
following the fleeing French government ± to Vichy amongst very 
adventurous circumstances. )RUPHU+XQJDULDQIRUHLJQPLQLVWHU&ViN\¶V
opinion Ä)UDQFH± for the predictable future at least ± will be no more a 
ILUVW FODVV SROLWLFDO SOD\HU LQ WKH ZRUOG´74 very likely met a broad 
agreement within the Hungarian public opinion. And this agreement 
was strengthened by reports from the Ä)UHH =RQH´ According to 
information RI WKH+XQJDULDQ$UP\¶V+HDGTXDUWHU WKH)UHQFK ORRNVDW
the activity of the Vichy government and its endeavor to collaborate with 
Germany with certain FDUHOHVVQHVV 3HRSOH GRQ¶W FDUH EXW about their 
subsistence 7KH\ FRQVLGHU0DUVKDOO 3pWDLQ WKHPHQWDO SULVRQHU RI WKH
Vichy government surrounded by self-seekers of every imaginable 
parties and movements. People hope the English final victory and de 
*DXOOH¶V SURSDJDQGD IDOOV RQ IHUWLOH VRLO. In a number of French towns 
posters in state offices recruit for the armed forces of Ä)UHH)UDQFH´ The 
Ä)UHH=RQH´ is characterized by discontent and general dismay.75 
,QVSLWHRIWKHIDFWWKDWIURPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRI+XQJDU\¶VUHYLVLRQLVW
endeavor France became absolutely uninteresting, the Hungarian 
diplomacy was keeping on observing French opinions. Accordingly the 
Hungarian envoy to Madrid reported on his change of view with 
0DUVKDOO 3pWDLQ $PEDVVDGRU RI )UDQFH WR0DGULG DW WKDW WLPH 3pWDLQ
was very positive about Transylvania. He declared that Hungary should 
not have urged its territorial claims during the war they should be 
presented after the war in the framework of a new general European 
territorial arrangement.76    
But these and the similar change of views went on in a sort of ÄYLUWXDO
                                                             
73 HNA 1940. K 63, 11/1 ± 21 March 1940. 
74 0DJ\DUNOSROLWLND1R 
75 HNA 1940. K 63 ,11/1, 12 Nov. 1940. 
76 HNA 1940. K 63 11/7, 6 March 1940. 
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VSDFH´ since the reality of the bilateral relations showed a basically 
different picture. E.g. the French envoy to Budapest informed the 
Hungarian Foreign ministry that the German ÄDUPLVWLFH committee´ 
protested against the French-Hungarian trade treaty. The Reich put on 
the record that Berlin set up a claim to all Hungarian food-products thus 
all French-Hungarian trade of agricultural yields must be stopped. Vichy 
protested against the German claim and asked the same intervention on 
behalf of Budapest in Berlin.77 
This was the reality ± HQIRUFHPHQWV RI*HUPDQ\¶V LQWHUHVWV )UDQFH
and Hungary could only come nearer within this framework ± 
accordingly the Hungarian foreign minister assured Vichy that Hungary 
gave a paUDPRXQWLPSRUWDQFHWR0DUVKDOO3pWDLQ¶V)UDQFHDQGKHKRSHG
that the ÄELWWHUPHPRULHV´ would disappear very soon.78  In return Vichy 
ZDV VDWLVILHG ZLWK +XQJDU\¶V MRLQLQJ ZLWK WKH Ä$QWLFRPLQWHUQ SDFW´ 
Khuen-+pGHUYiU\ GLGQ¶W RPLW WR DGG WKDW %XGDSHVW ÄPRUH LQWLPDWH´ 
relations with the Axis powers produced positive reaction on behalf of 
Vichy because the Hungarian move ÄEDFNVWKHSROLWLFVRIFROODERUDWLRQ
RIWKHDFWXDO)UHQFKJRYHUQPHQWXS´79  
The remark was right. The leading politicians of Vichy mentioned 
several times the political common interest ÄLQ WKH ILJKW DJDLQVW
bolshevism DQG LQ YLHZ RI WKH SODFH LQ WKH QHZ (XURSH´ to the 
Hungarian envoy.80 0RUHRYHU 3pWDLQ VHW IRUFH LQ GHWDLO WR WKH QHZ
Hungarian envoy to Vichy that there were lots of analogy between the 
present French situation and that of the Hungarian one following the 
first world war and there were similitudes EHWZHHQ +RUWK\¶V SRVWZDU
SHULRG¶VGXWLHVDQGKLV3pWDLQFRQWHPSRUDU\GXWLHVÄ+HWKLQNVKLVILUVW
task is the restoration of order. He wants to arrive to this goal by the 
establishment of an authoritarian regime ± he said ± by the elimination 
of the parliament. He wished to shore the old historical regions up 
LQVWHDG RI ¶GpSDUWHPHQWV¶´81 However in his reports the new Hungarian 
envoy to Vichy %DNiFK-Bessenyey) very precisely put down the process 
                                                             
77 HNA 1941, K 63, 11/1, 14 March 1941. 
78 HNA 15 Nov. 1940, K 448 (confidential papers) The disappearance of 
ÄELWWHU PHPRULHV´ was not at all helped by the Hungarian occupation of 
Northern Serbia ± former Hungarian territory. According to Khuen-+pGHUYiU\
Ä1R GRXEW WKDW WKH PDUFKLQJ RI RXU WURRSV LQ WR WKH IRUPHU -XJRVODYLDQ
territory shortly after the signing of the friendship treaty produced a definitely 
unfavourable impression. All of those who presented their congratulation for 
Transylvania are silent today. Of course I have no doubt about the fact that in 
our days Europe what kind of opinion are bearing political circles of the French 
Ä)UHH]RQH´FRQFHUQLQJVXFKDQ LPSRUWDQWDFWLRQIRUXVLVPHDQLQJOHVV´  HNA, 
1941 K 63, 11/1, 22 Apr. 1941. 
79 HNA 1940, K 63, 11/7, 7 Dec. 1940. 
80 HNA 1941, K 63, 11/1, 21 Aug. 1941. 
81 idem 26 Aug. 1941. 
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ÄRI WKH QHZ GLFWDWRULDO SROLWLFDO FRXUVH´ and that of the ÄWRWDOLWDULDQ
RUJDQL]DWLRQRIWKHVWDWH´ %DNiFK-Bessenyey considered that this process 
was the total fitting of Vichy into the collaboration with the Reich.82 
Bilateral relations had been slowly reduced to transmit Hungarian 
protest against the anti-Hungarian propaganda of Romania WR 9LFK\¶V
foreign ministry (since Hungarian and Romanian protests had been 
arriving continuously Laval was feed up and was doing everything to 
stop the publication these protests LQ 9LFK\¶V SUHVV ± reported the 
Hungarian envoy.) French-Hungarian partnership was absolutely 
excluded. According to the very accurate report of %DNiFK-Bassenyey 
Ä9LFK\ GRHV QRt have a foreign policy. The sovereignty RI WKH Ä)UHH
=RQH´ LV QRQ-existing. Even in public administration its power is 
restricted by German RU,WDOLDQSURWHVWV«to speak about independent 
foreign policy is nonsense. Without the permission of the Axis no one 
can go in or go out of France. The government cannot send telegrams 
or letters abroad. All of its activity depends on the Axis. It cannot act in 
catimini neither since the country is overrun by spies, informers, 
*HUPDQDQG,WDOLDQLQVSHFWRUV7KXVWKHJRYHUQPHQWGRHVQ¶Wdare and 
cannot act. The total lack of sovereignty is proved by the fact that on 
German pression Vichy interned the personnel of all diplomatic 
representation, which ceased diplomatic relations with Germany or 
was at war with this latter. Germany wants to transport them to 
Baden-Baden as it GLGZLWKWKH$PHULFDQGLSORPDWV´83  
A horrible chapter of the wartime French-Hungarian relations was 
WKH VWDWXV RI +XQJDULDQ -HZV ZKR JRW VWXFN LQ )UDQFH 9LFK\¶V ODZV
regarding foreigners and Jews ± which were valid in occupied and free 
zone alike ± trapped Jews residing on French soil. Some of them (who 
could prove their Hungarian citizenship asked and received Hungarian 
SDVVSRUWDIWHU)UDQFH¶VFROODSVHIOHGWR+XQJDU\searching safety « 
But the Jews remained in France found themselves in the same desperate, 
hopeless situation. Counselor +ROOiQFDOOHGWKH+XQJDULDQPLQLVWU\RIIRUHLJQ
affaires from the legation to Berlin that Radio Paris launched for the second 
time in the air the warning that Hungarian Jews in Paris must presenting 
themselves to the Prefecture for their compulsory yellow ribbon. The decree 
concerned the Hungarian Jews only ± WKH,WDOLDQ6SDQLVKHWF«-HZVZHUH
left out. The question emerged earlier. At that time the legation to Berlin on 
the basis of departmental order sent instructions to the Hungarian General 
consulate to Paris to protest against the discriminatory treatment of the 
Hungarian Jews and claim the same rights the Italian Jews had. To wear a 
yellow ribbon has consequences on the property of the bearer thus the decree 
imperiled Hungarian property ± stated the Hungarian foreign ministry. 
Counselor +ROOiQ DWWULEXWHG WKH UHSHDWHGO\ SODQQHG DFWLRQV DJDLQVW
                                                             
82 idem 30 Aug. 1941. 
83 HNA, 1943, K 63 11/1. 19 Jan. 1943. 
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Hungarian Jews living in France to rumors according to which some qualified 
personality of the Hungarian foreign ministry stated that the fate of 
+XQJDULDQ -HZV RI )UDQFH IRU WKH+XQJDULDQ JRYHUQPHQWZDVQ¶W RI VRPH
FRQFHUQ+ROOiQUHSRUWHGWKDWDQXPEHURI*HUPDQDXWKRULW\UHIHUUHGWRWKLV
statement and he asked for instructions by wire for the procedure to follow 
concerning the above-mentioned planned actions.84 
7ZRPRQWKV ODWHU %DNiFK-Bessenyey paid a call on Laval who was 
nominated Prime minister on German pressure. Following his 
nomination the German begun to claim the immediate deportation of 
Jews residing in France. First Laval refused to obey but later he agreed. 
After discussing the eternal topic ± Hungarian-Romanian relations ± 
Laval declared that expulsion orders for Jews (and to transfer them to 
*HUPDQ\GLGQ¶WFRQFHUQ+XQJDULDQ-HZVUHsiding on French soil. But ± 
he added - it could not be excluded that Germany would claim that 
)UDQFHKDQGRYHUWKHVH-HZVWRR/DYDODVNHG%DNiFK-Bassenyey that in 
this case to avoid the transfer of Hungarian Jews in France to Germany 
would the Hungarian government be ready to readmit the Jews in 
question? The Hungarian envoy answer was that distinction must be 
drawn between Jews coming from Hungarian territory (including the 
freshly reattached territories, too) and Jews with Hungarian citizenship. 
The HuQJDULDQJRYHUQPHQW FRXOGQ¶W EH LQGLIIHUHQW WR WKH IDWH RI WKHVH
latters ± thus in given cases the Hungarian envoy would be obliged to 
intervene in their interest. Laval added that to save the French Jews he 
should get rid of immigrants ± thus to transfer the Hungarian Jews, too. 
,QKLVUHSRUW%DNiFK-Bessenyey raised the possibility that under German 
pressure further anti-Jewish measures could be introduced in France, 
and this time they could concern Hungarian Jews residing in France. 
The envoy notified in advance that if these measures should have been 
brought in he would ask instructions for the stand to follow.85 
%DNiFK-Bessenyey went back to his notice next year in his report on 
his new meeting with Laval of the 5th Jan. 1943. Laval wanted to know if 
the Hungarian government had been disposed to take back Jews of 
Hungarian descent living in France? According to his rHSRUWWKHHQYR\¶V
answer was: ÄAs you instructed me, Sir86, I told him that the Hungarian 
JRYHUQPHQW FRXOGQ¶WDJUHH WR WKHGHSRUWDWLRQRI-HZVZith Hungarian 
citizenship to the East. It protests against measures aiming at the wealth 
of those Jews and finally in case of emergency it is ready ± in principle ± 
to permit the Jews having unquestionable Hungarian citizenship to come 
back to Hungary but this return will be hardly realizable given the 
difficulties to obtain German and Italian transit visa´87 
                                                             
84 idem 31 Jul. 1942. 
85 HNA, 1942, K 63, 11/1 ± 11 Sept. 1942. 
86 The foreign minister 
87 HNA 1943, K 63, 11/1, 5 Jan. 1943. 
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As time went by, mostly ÄDIIDLUVZLWK FRQVXODUQDWXUH´ emerged in 
FRQWDFWV ZLWK WKH 9LFK\ JRYHUQPHQW &KDUJp G¶DIIDLUHV a.i. Hertelendy 
sent home a lengthy report about the facts that in the Ä)UHH =RQH´ 
anybody could be sent into labor camps where they were forced to slave 
labor and fed with shoddy food. Jewish and Aryan Hungarian citizens 
were interned alike. At the beginning jobless people were interned and it 
was acceptable since they got food but later those measures were valid 
IRU HYHU\ERG\ $IWHUZDUGV 9LFK\¶V IRUHLJQPLQLVWU\ FRPPXQLFDWHG LQ D
circular note that all single Jews with foreign citizenship arrived after 
1933 and residing on French soil since more than two months would be 
sent to labor camps. The Hungarian legation protested against this 
measure and asked for Hungarian citizens with Jewish descent be set 
free from the labor camps. The legation declared that the Hungarian 
government was ready to take them back. Hertelendy thought that ± as 
for the Jews ± there would be a hard task to transit Germany and Italy.  
The legation had not been protesting against other discriminatory 
measures because identity cards and other documents of Jews with 
Hungarian citizenship (as these of other Jews) were earlier stamped, the 
defense to leave their residence concerned every foreigner since they 
were allowed to circulate in the country only with a special permit. As for 
the plan to expel Jews from departments along the French-Italian 
border it was taken off the order of the day following the Italian 
RFFXS\LQJIRUFHV¶SURWHVWV± thus all further intervention of the legation 
became unnecessary. In connection with this information counselor 
Hertelendy made mention of the fact that the Italian military authorities 
in their zone impeded the anti-Jewish measures of the French 
government declared under German pressure and they gave easily 
transit-visa to Jews. The Italian military authorities in Nizza and the 
Italian consuls of Nizza and Monte-Carlo were putting under their 
protection Hungarian Jews asking for it.88   
Hertelendy thought important to report about the situation of foreign 
Jews in France further on. One occasion he reported that French 
authorities called upon Jews on posters in the Ä)UHH =RQH´ to declare 
their intention: would they go back to where they came from or not? 
Hertelendy informed the inquiring Hungarian Jews that till they had 
and if they had Hungarian citizenship they would be under the 
protection of the Hungarian legation. He thought that the major part of 
Hungarian Jews would prefer to stay in France instead of being deported 
to Poland. (It shows that in 1943 the deportation of Jews to Poland was 
of common knowledge, yet!)  
According to Hertelendy the anti-Jewish measures of the French 
government were partly motivated by its intention to hand over rather 
                                                             
88 HNA 1943, K 63, 11/1 ± 20 Jan. 1943. 
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foreign Jews to the German instead of ÄLWVRZQ-HZV´ As for Hungarian 
Jews no special measures were introduced ± he reported. On 
instructions from the Hungarian foreign ministry he intervened at 
9LFK\¶VIRUHLJQPLQLVWU\DVNLQJWKDW+XQJDULDQ-HZVEHQRWLQWHUQHG+H
gave an affirmative answer on the French question be the Jews rather 
sent into labor camp? Hertelendy added that the French government 
wished Hungary transported home Hungarian Jews from France. He 
was instructed to tell Vichy that the Hungarian government was engaged 
in dealing with the question of transporting home Jews with proven 
Hungarian citizenship staying in France. 
Vichy gDYHIXUWKHUH[SODQDWLRQODWHUWKH)UHQFKJRYHUQPHQWGRHVQ¶W
feel itself capable to protect foreign Jews against the German and that is 
why it asks the concerned government ÄWRWUDQVSRUWKRPHWKHLU-HZV´ 
Vichy asked the Jews about their intention of going away or staying in 
France because it wanted to know what kind of stand it should take 
against German intentions concerning the Jews. For Hertelendy it was 
obvious that the French government was looking for excuses in case of 
handing over the Jews staying in France to Germany. If it would actually 
happen Vichy could refer to the fact that it offered a possibility to the 
-HZVWRJRKRPHEXWWKH\GLGQ¶WJUDEWKLVRFFDVLRQ7KHFKDUJpG¶DIIDLUH
a.i. estimated to roughly 400 the number of Jews with proven 
Hungarian citizenship staying in the former Ä)UHH=RQH´.89 $IWHU,WDO\¶V
baling out the Jews in France FRXOGQ¶W count with the Italian goodwill 
rather on that of a part of French they could thank their life to. 
The Hungarian legation to Vichy strove to give a realistic picture 
about the changing situation following the brutal defeats suffered by 
German troops on the Eastern front in 1943. Counselor Hertelendy 
commenting on the declarations of the chief press officer of the German 
embassy to Vichy reported Ä, KDG serious doubts about was I awake 
XS"´ The Ä EOXVWHULQJ DERXW WKH wonder weapon and the rout of 
Russians truly VHHPV FDSDEOH WR FRQFHDO WKH JORRP\ UHDOLW\«DQG WR
prevent the prestige of the Axis from falling down in the eyes of the 
SXEOLF RSLQLRQ´90 (As for 3pWDLQ¶V ÄQDWLRQDO UHYROXWLRQ´ WKH OHJDWLRQ¶V
reports are moderate, repeatedly informed about inner anarchy, Laval-
3pWDLQFRQIOLFWDQGDERXWWKHIDFWWKDWÄWHUURULVWV´ do what they want .) 
0HDQZKLOH HQYR\ %DNiFK-Bessenyey drew the attention to the 
possibility that ÄLQFDVHRIWKHPRUHDQGPRUHOLNHO\YLFWRU\RIWKHDOOLHG
powers France will be the fourth in the group of Great Powers 
IROORZLQJ(QJODQGWKH86$DQG5XVVLD´ but if Germany would win the 
ZDU WKH EXLOW D 1HZ (XURSH ZRQ¶W EH UHDOL]DEOH ZLWKRXW )rance ± 
FRQVHTXHQWO\+XQJDU\PXVWFXOWLYDWHJRRGUHODWLRQVZLWK+HU+HGLGQ¶W
RPLW WR DGG WKDW WKH IDFW WKDW RQH RI WKH SLOODUV RI WKH 1HZ (XURSH¶V
                                                             
89 idem, Apr. 1943. 
90 Idem 5 Jul. 1943.  
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WRWDOLWDULDQ RUGHU 0XVVROLQL¶V ,WDO\ GLVDSSHDUHG IURP WKH VFHQH
practically in one minute without Germany¶V ZLOO RU possibility to 
prevent this fall created a very bad impression on circles close to the 
government. It was not a very encouraging incident for the Vichy regime, 
which is not rooted in the people. The public opinion hoped that the 
Italian showdown PHDQW WKH TXLFN HQG RI WKH ZDU DQG *HUPDQ\¶V
defeat.91 The Hungarian General Consul to Paris reported in a similar 
tone and illustrated on the basis of statistical data from confidential 
French sources that the Axis was incapable to compete with the 
American war-production.92 
$V WKH ZDU FDPH QHDUHU WR WKH HQG 9LFK\¶V LQWHUHVW LQ +XQJDU\
manifested itself on propaganda level ÄLQ WKH VSLULW RI ILJKW DJDLQVW
bolshevism´ ± and the Vichy press took over articles from Hungarian 
papers which stated that the Soviets wanted to deport Hungarians to 
Turkestan and the Soviet victory would be a ÄVXSHU7ULDQRQ´ for Hungary. 
Number of Vichy paper dealt with the history of ÄEROVKHYLVPLQ+XQJDU\´
Hungary was present at the exhibition Ä%ROFKHYLVPHFRQWUHO¶(XURSH´ and 
on the occasion of the anniversary of the proletarian dictatorship in 
Hungary (in 1919) some paper wrote about the ÄGHHGV RI WKH.XQ%pOD¶V
UHJLPH´ 2WKHU SDSHUV UHYLHZHG +XQJDU\¶V KLVWRU\ DV WKH KLVWRU\ RI
ÄEXOZDUN RI &KULVWLDQLW\´ 0RUHRYHU WKH Ä5pDOLWp´93 took RYHU%XGDSHVW¶V
propaganda thesis under the title Ä)DFHjODPHQDFHTXLYLHQWGH0RVFRXOD
+RQJULHEDVWLRQDYDQFpHWUHPSDUWGH ODFLYLOLVDWLRQRFFLGHQWDOH´ And a 
JRRGQXPEHU RI DUWLFOHV RI WKH%XGDSHVW SUHVVZHUH SXEOLVKHG LQ9LFK\¶V
newspapers.94 In spite of these publications in war-time circumstances the 
public opinion was absolutely uninterested toward news coming from 
Hungary ± DQGWKHIDFWWKDW9LFK\¶VLQIRUPDWLRQRIILFHLQVWUXFWHGWKHSUHVV
to publish articles about Hungary FRXOGQ¶W change this indifference ± 
noticed the Hungarian envoy.95 
Thus the French press abundantly commented the German 
occupation of Hungary on the 19th March of 1944 ± they communicated 
the German arguments according to which the move was made 
necessary by military considerations. I.e. since the Russians were 
advancing westward the Wehrmacht needed the Hungarian theatre of 
operation. What happened it happened with the agreement of Governor 
Horthy ± in accordance with the Anticomintern Pact. They took as the 
HYLGHQFH RI +RUWK\¶V agreement the fact that he nominated the new 
government the next day. Hungary preserved its freedom of decision ± 
they wrote. The major part of the press underlined the anti-bolshevist 
                                                             
91 idem 3-4 Aug. 1943. 
92 HNA 1943, K 63 11/1- 12 May 1943. 
93 27 Febr. 1943. 
94 idem 28 Apr. 1943. 
95 HNA 1944, K 63 11/7, 21 Febr 1944. 
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attitude of Hungary. Part of the newspapers with far-rightwing bias in 
Paris drew a parallel between the ÄHungarian clique of expecting 
attitude and the expecting policy of Vichy and the Hungarian pro-
English attitude and the pro-(QJOLVK DWWLWXGH RI 9LFK\´ ± and they 
explained the German action with those conclusions.96 
Anyway, the information the deputy of the Hungarian foreign 
minister forwarded WR WKH&KDUJpG¶DIIDLUHV WR9LFK\ÄDWKLVGLVFUHWLRQ´ 
about the ÄHYHQWVKDSSHQHGLQUHFHQWGD\V´ essentially was repeating the 
German arguments.97 But the analysis of the political diUHFWRURI9LFK\¶V
foreign ministry was totally different. According to him the German 
occupation was the consequence of the fact that the Hungarian envoy to 
Helsinki sent home very optimistic reports about the Soviet-Finnish 
WDONV7KH.iOOD\JRYHUQPHQWZDnted to follow the Finnish example and 
.iOOD\ZDVVHHNLQJFRQWDFWVZLWKWKH$OOLHV± and that was why Germany 
stepped in and a new government was formed.98 The press of the Milice 
explanation was that Hungary did want to preserve Transylvania and 
that was why it spared its forces against the Soviet and the Ä0DUFK
HYHQWV´eliminated this endeavor. 
As the final victory of the Allied nations became more and more 
certain the suggestion of the French-Hungarian community of fate 
became stronger and stronger especially following Ä' GD\´ It is 
noteworthy that how strong was the French far-rightwing, pro-German 
and Nazi press interest toward Hungary. The press of both zones 
SXEOLVKHG +RUWK\¶V JHQHUDO RUGHU WR WKH $UP\ XQGHUOLQLQJ WKH SKUDVH
ÄQRW D VWHS EDFN´ The French propaganda organisms were instructed 
(on German demand) to accentuate the role of the Hungarian armed 
forces on the Eastern front and to publish the Hungarian war 
FRPPXQLTXpV7KHSUHVVZDVDVSRVLWLYHDERXW+XQJDU\DVQHYHUEHIRUH
Hungary was presented fighting in the first line against Äbolshevism´ as 
a fortress of the Western civilization. The reason of this Hungarian 
engagement was - according to the French press ± the fact that Hungary 
had experienced the Bolshevik reign of terror yet. They even attacked 
.iURO\L ZKR DW WKDW WLPH WULHG WR RUJDQL]HG +XQJDULDQ HPLJUDQWV LQ
England. And it was that time for the first occasion that the French press 
published a lengthy article (entitled: Masonic peace in 1919), which 
through the Hungarian viewpoint analyzed Trianon and ÄWKHLQWULJXHVRI
%HQHVDQGWKHORGJHV´ ± the reason of the dismemberment of Hungary. 
Then another part of the press informed its readers about the history of 
the Ä-HZLVKquestion LQ+XQJDU\´ starting from conclusions about the 
Ä%pOD.XQUHJLPH´ underlining the role of Jews in the leadership of this 
                                                             
96 idem 6 Apr. 1944. 
97 idem 17 Apr. 1944. 
98 idem 13 May 1944. 
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regime.99 $QG WKH\ GLGQ¶W IRUJHW WR SXEOLVK ÄLQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH
UDGLFDOVHWWOHPHQWRIWKH-HZLVKTXHVWLRQLQ+XQJDU\´.100 
A train of bad decisions swept in one camp the leadership of the two 
countries during the war and one of the consequences of those bad 
decisions was that more than thirty years had to be gone till a renewed 
and useful dialogue could be restarted between the two countries. 
 
                                                             
99 idem, 13 May 1944. 
100 idem, 5 Jul. 1944. 
